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Abstract
The seminal Barro (2006) closed-economy model of the equity risk premium in the presence
of extreme events ("disasters") allowed for leverage in the form of risky corporate debt
which defaulted only in states when the Government defaulted on its debt. The probability
of default was therefore exogenous and independent of the degree of leverage. In this paper,
we take the model a step closer reality by assuming that, on the one hand, the Government
never defaults, and on the the other hand, that the corporate sector in the form of the
Lucas tree owner pays its debts in full if and only if its asset value is su¢ cient, which is
always the case in non-crisis states. Otherwise, in exceptionally severe crises, it defaults and
hands over the whole rmto its creditors. The probability of default by the tree owner is
thus endogenous, dependent both on the volume of debt issued (taken as exogenous) and on
the uncertain value of output. We show, using data from both Barro (2006) and Barro and
Ursua (2008), that the model can generate values of the riskless rate, equity risk premium
and credit risk spread broadly consistent with those typically observed in the data.
JEL Classication: F3, G1
Keywords: equity risk premium, default risk, credit spread, leverage, corporate debt
1 Introduction
For practitioners and academics alike, the size of the credit risk spread is a long-standing
puzzle, whose solution seems more urgent than ever against the background of the crisis in
global nancial markets which started in mid-2007. In this paper, we concur with the view
taken in Bhamra et al (2007), Chen et al (2008) and Chen (2007) among others, that the
issue needs to be addressed alongside the equity premium puzzle, and moreover in a setting
which takes explicit account of the vulnerability of all economies to occasional extreme,
invariably negative shocks. In this spirit, we follow the macronance approach pioneered by
Rietz (1988) and extended in the seminal work by Barro (2006), whose model of the equity
risk premium in the presence of extreme events has already generated a new literature
on crises and their implications for asset pricing. Most of the papers modify the basic
framework in one way or another in order to generalise the model and make its assumptions
more realistic, with varying conclusions regarding the robustness of Barro (2006)s claim to
have resolved the famous equity premium puzzle.
Thus, Gourio (2007) examines the evidence on how quickly countries typically recover
from catastrophic falls in the level of economic activity and nds that incorporating a re-
covery probability into the model makes it again impossible to explain the stylized facts.
Starting from a di¤erent point of view, Copeland and Zhu (2007) show that if we allow for
a second tree (a foreign country), then anything less than perfect correlation between
the output of the two trees implies the existence of diversication opportunities, making
it almost impossible to reconcile the observed 6% risk premium with the parameter values
derived in Barro (2006) from a survey of twentieth century experience.
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On the other hand, a number of developments on the empirical research front make the
problem somewhat more tractable. First, Dimson et al (2006) suggest that, viewed from a
global perspective, the equity premium is not quite as large as for the original US dataset
of Mehra and Prescott (1985). Secondly, after substantially broadening the scope of their
analysis of the historical data, Barro and Ursua (2008) conclude that the probability of a
crisis is in fact double the gure given in Barro (2006), which would be likely to boost
estimated risk premia for most calibrations, other things being equal.1 On the theoretical
front, Gabaix (2008) introduces a time-varying intensity of disasters into the model and
claims to explain the risk premium along with a number of other stylized facts in the asset
pricing literature.
The contribution made by this paper relates to the submodel of the debt market. Barro (2006)
allows for leverage in the form of risky corporate debt which defaults only in states when
the Government also defaults on its debt. The latter event occurs with exogenously given
probability in some but not all crisis states. In this setting, the probability of default by the
tree-owner is therefore exogenous and independent of the degree of leverage.
Here, we take the model a step closer to reality by assuming that, on the one hand, the
Government never defaults,2 and on the other hand, that the corporate sectorin the form
of the Lucas (1978) tree owner pays its debts in full if and only if its exogenous harvest is
1 See also Brown, Goetzmann and Ross (1995), Jorion and Goetzmann (1999) who make essentially the
same point in drawing attention to the survivorship bias implicit in ignoring the losses inicted on investors
by the wars and revolutions of the Twentieth Century, especially when these disasters resulted in stock
market closure, expropriation or wipe-out.
2 Government defaults on domestic currency unindexed debt are quite rare, at least if we exclude devel-
oping countries, though not apparently as rare as we thought prior to reading Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2008).
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su¢ cient, which is always the case in non-crisis states. In some, but not all crisis states,
however, output is inadequate to cover debt service, in which case it hands over the whole
harvest to its creditors. The probability of default by the tree-owner is thus endogenous,
dependent both on the volume of debt issued (taken as exogenous) and on the uncertain
value of output. By deriving a closed-form solution for the critical value of output below
which the rm is unable to repay its borrowing, we are able to nd expressions for the riskless
rate, equity risk premium and credit risk spread as well as the (endogenous) probability of
default. Calibrations with parameter values based on data from both Barro (2006) and
Barro and Ursua (2008), show that the model specied in this fashion can generate results
consistent with the broad outline of the facts, even with reasonably low levels of risk aversion.
In the following sections, we give a brief survey of related literature on the credit spread,
followed by an overview of the original Barro (2006) crisis model. We then proceed to set
out the submodel of corporate debt which is to be embedded in the crisis model (Section 4).
Solving the model for the rates of return on the three types of security (equity, private sector
debt and Government debt) in Section 5, we are able to derive expressions for the credit
risk spread and equity premium (Section 6). The results of our calibration are discussed in
Sections 7 and 8.
2 Literature Review
If investors are risk-averse, the credit spread between the yield on corporate and Government
debt should reect the sum of the expected default loss and the default risk premium. Various
models of credit risk have been proposed to explain the size of the credit risk premium, but
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the consensus remains that models calibrated to match the observed default data predict
a far lower credit spread than is consistent with the data, a failure often called the credit
spread puzzle in the published literature.
Researchers have explored a number of di¤erent avenues in attempting to explain this
anomaly. Elton et al (2001) showed that the favourable treatment of government bonds
relative to corporate debt under the US tax regime accounts for some of the spread. However,
this can hardly be the end of the story, since De Jong and Driessen (2006) show that the
credit spread is puzzlingly high in Europe too, even though European corporate bonds are
not subject to tax at state level.
More importantly as far as the present paper is concerned, Elton et al (2001) found that
the credit risk premium i.e the residual spread after allowing for expected default cost and
tax e¤ects, was related to the stock market risk premium associated with the Fama-French
3-factor Model, thereby making a direct empirical link between the equity risk premium and
the credit spread.
Another obvious possibility is that the spread may be due to the convertibility options fre-
quently attached to corporate debt. On closer investigation, however, the conversion feature
turns out to be able to account for only around 10 basis points of the spread (Crabbe (1991)).
Similarly, the liquidity premium to compensate for the fact that corporate debt markets are
far thinner than Government debt markets should only be about 25 points (Ericsson (2005),
Perraudin and Taylor (2003) and Amato and Remolona (2005)). Given that the spread is
around 200 basis points (Huang and Huang (2003)), the two together can only account for
a very small proportion.
Structural models which treat debt and equity as contingent claims on the asset value of
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the rm, following Merton (1974) and Black and Cox (1976), are also incapable of fully ex-
plaining the spread (Jones et al (1984)). Moreover, extensions to the original model intended
to solve the problem have had limited success. For example, a number of papers make the de-
fault boundary endogenous. In Leland (1994), (1998) and Leland and Toft (1996), the cap-
ital structure of a rm is chosen by equity holders to maximize their utility. To avoid bank-
ruptcy, rms issue more debts whenever possible. Default occurs when equity value drops
to zero. On the other hand, in Anderson and Sundaresan (1996), Anderson et al (1996) and
Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997), equity owners choose to default in order to extract con-
cessions from bondholders. Bondholders therefore demand a premium for holding corporate
bonds. Fischer et al (1989) and Goldstein et al (2001) show that the value of the rm is max-
imized when the leverage ratio is kept within a small band, while Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001)
proposed a model in which the capital structure is set to generate a stationary leverage ratio.
While these authors claim their models generate a credit spread close to what we observe
in the data, Huang and Huang (2003) show that, when calibrated to match the default
frequency and recovery rate, they are all inadequate in explaining the credit spread. Likewise,
the introduction of a jump process for the underlying value can be consistent with a larger
credit spread (Zhou (2001) and Delianedis and Geske (2001)), but only with unrealistic jump
parameters.
Another possible route to a wider credit spread involves nonstandard assumptions re-
garding utility. For example, Chen et al (2008) use Campbell and Cochrane (1999) habit
formation to generate a counter-cyclical time-varying risk premium. However, calibration
results showed that habit formation could only generate a su¢ ciently high credit spread in
combination with an exogenous countercyclical default boundary or idiosyncratic volatility.
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3 The Barro (2006) Setting
The broad framework of our analysis follows Barro (2006), insofar as we start from an econ-
omy populated by a representative agent with time-additive utility and an initial endowed
income in the form of the fruit of a Lucas-tree, with equity claims on the time t+1 stochas-
tic endowment ("dividends") traded at time t. Specically, agents maximise a power utility
function3 of the standard form:
Et(U) = U(Ct) +
1P
s=1
e sEt [U(Ct+s)] (1)
where:
U(Ct+s) =
C1 t+s
1   (2)
while the (log of the) endowment process, At, is a random walk with drift , and subject
to two types of disturbance at any time, t+ 1:
gt+1 = lnAt+1   lnAt =  + ut+1 + vt+1 (3)
The rst disturbance, ut+1, is normally distributed with zero mean and constant vari-
ance, 2. The crucial component is the nonnormal shock vt+1 which takes the value zero
(i.e no crisis) with probability e p and the value ln dt+1 with probability (1   e p), where
p is approximately the probability of a crisis (a "disaster"), and 0 < dt+1 < 1 is a random
3 Barro and Ursua (2008), Gourio (2007), Chen (2007) use the Epstein-Zinn utility function, which has
the advantage of incorporating separate parameters for the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution and
coe¢ cient of risk aversion, but has the disadvantage of making it even harder to arrive at closed-form
solutions. It could also be argued that using a nonseparable utility function, as we do here, makes the task
of matching the observed data more of a challenge.
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variable representing the level to which output falls in a disaster scenario. The distribu-
tion of dt+1 is approximated empirically by the frequency found in the Barro (2006) and
Barro and Ursua (2008) research on the economic history of the past century.4 It is impor-
tant to note that ut+1 and vt+1 are assumed to be independent identically-distributed shocks.
Even in crisis states, the economy is still assumed to be subject to the normal zero-mean
shock process (albeit tiny relative to dt+1), so we nd it convenient to write crisis output
before allowing for growth as:
wt+1  eut+1dt+1
4 Debt Markets
We deviate from Barro (2006) in our specication of the market for the two types of xed-
income instrument traded in the model. First, we assume the Government issues a bill or
bond in the form of a claim paying a xed return, R. Government borrowing is completely
riskless, in the sense that in this model the Government never defaults in any state of the
world. This specication is in contrast to Barro (2006), who assumes that in extreme crisis
states, the Government and private sector both default, an event which occurs with an
exogenously given probability conditional on an output disaster.
In our model, unlike Government debt, the privately-issued xed interest security is sub-
ject to default risk. The rm which owns the tree issues t one-period securities 5 promising
4 Note that Barro (2006) writes his equations in terms of the size of the fall in output in the crisis state,
whereas we nd it convenient to deal with the level of output in a crisis i.e our d is equivalent to his (1  b).
5 For the sake of consistency, we can think of the equityholder issuing the debt in order to nance the
purchase of shares. In a sense, therefore, the tree is not part of the initial endowment, but needs to be
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a face return, xed in advance at time t for payment at t+ 1: In noncrisis situations and in
all but the most severe crises, output is adequate to cover the cost of paying the face return,
RFt+1, leaving the residue as a dividend to the equityholders, but in the event of a severe
crisis, it may fall short, so that the rm is forced to default on its debt. In this extreme
scenario, the bondholder receives the whole output, and the equity gets nothing. However, in
the aftermath of a default, the rm is reconstituted in the next period with the same degree
of leverage, an assumption required in order to preserve the IID property of cashows. It
follows that the realized return on corporate debt, RBt+1 depends on realized output at time
t + 1. If output is su¢ cient to cover the contractual payment tRFt+1, the realized return
equals the face return. Otherwise, the entire output is paid to bondholders, so that, in the
event of default, the realized bond return is At+1=t.
When the period length is small, the price of the claim on the entire output at time t+1
approximates output at time t. Hence, the debt-equity (leverage) ratio of the rm can be
written as:
t =
t
At   t
We nd it easier to work with the asset-debt ratio:
t =
At
t
(4)
Given these assumptions, we can derive the critical value of output, At+1; below which
default occurs:
At+1 = tR
F
t+1
purchased at the outset with the proceeds of the bond sale, as in Barro (2006).
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Using (3) and (4), we can rewrite the critical output value (as a proportion of trend) in
terms of the underlying shocks as follows:
wt+1 =
RFt+1
te
(5)
so that wt+1 is the critical point on the distribution of the composite random variable
eut+1dt+1, determined by the joint distribution of the normal shock, ut+1, and the crisis shock,
dt+1.
These changes to the model have far-reaching implications. First, instead of being an
event occuring with an exogenously xed probability, default happens whenever output falls
below the endogenously-determined critical level, wt+1, for which we solve below. For the
moment, note that wt+1 is determined by a number of factors, most importantly the leverage
ratio since, other things being equal, the more debt the tree-owner issues, the greater the
burden of repayments and therefore the smaller the output contraction su¢ cient to cause a
default. Associated with this critical level of wt+1 is a probability which, for convenience in
writing out the model equations, we denote :
t+1 = Pr(wt+1 < w

t+1)
which is the probability of default conditional on a crisis occurring. Note that, in spite
of the shorthand, t+1 is not exogenous, but is determined by the model parameters and, in
particular, by the initial leverage ratio.
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5 The Model Solution6
As a rst step to solving the model, we compute the stochastic discount factor (SDF) in
each of the three states of the world with which we are concerned here. In the no-disaster
scenario, when output is subject only to normally-distributed shocks, the SDF is derived
straightforwardly from the rst-order conditions as:
Mt+1 = e
   ut+1 (6)
Now consider the two disaster states. In the rst, output falls disastrously, but not
enough to cause a default i.e. wt+1  wt+1 < 1. In the second, the negative shock is so great
that output falls below the critical value at which the rm goes into default. However, since
the SDF depends on the level of output and hence consumption, and not on its distribution
between equity and bondholders, it is the same function of d whether the outcome is above
or below the critical value. The crisis SDF is therefore simply:
d t+1Mt+1 (7)
Note that since dt+1 is the level of output in the crisis state as a proportion of its noncrisis
level, and it is usually assumed that  >> 1, it follows that the discount factor in these states
is a multiple of its normal size, a factor which will be critical in explaining why the model
generates substantial risk premia, since it implies that the marginal utility of consumption
increases sharply as it falls. It follows that assets which either deliver reduced payo¤s (like
corporate debt) or possibly no payo¤at all (equity) in disaster scenarios are valued far lower,
other things being equal, than those which give a return in all possible states (Government
debt).
6 Most of the derivations are given in the Appendix to the paper.
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As far as the payo¤ on the corporate debt is concerned, the expected value of its return
in each state valued by the corresponding SDF has to satisfy the condition: 1 = E(SDFt+1 
RBt+1). In the two nondefault states it pays the face return originally promised, R
F
t+1, whereas
when wt+1 < wt+1; the situation is more complicated. In this case, bondholders receive the
total output, so that the relationship between the face return and wt+1 depends on the degree
of leverage.
Given the value of the SDF in each of the three relevant states, and the payo¤ on the
debt in each state, we can compute the expected return for t+1, conditioned on information
at time t, as:7
lnERBt+1  (1  pt+1) lnRFt+1 + pt+1
h
te
+ 1
2
2  E(dt+1 j wt+1 < wt+1)  1
i
(8)
This says that the (log of) the expected return o¤ered by this security is a weighted average
of two components, the face return (i.e. assuming no default), RFt+1, and the return in the
default scenario, the latter being the bondholders claim on the normal growth in output,
te
+ 1
2
2 , scaled down by the proportionate fall in output that brings about the default.
Note that the impact of the asset-to-debt ratio, t, is complicated. In the rst place, a
higher value of t (lower leverage) makes the return greater in the event of default, and also
raises the size of the contraction needed to trigger a default, reducing wt+1, and consequently
also the default probability, t+1. At the same time, the greater security associated with
lower leverage (higher t) lowers the equilibrium nominal return, other things being equal.8
7 As all expectations in the model are for time t + 1 conditional on time t information, we drop the
subscripts on the expectation operator from now on.
8 In the Appendix, we give the explicit solution for the face return and also the proof that both it and
the critical output value are increasing in p and in the leverage.
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The return on default-free government debt, which is the riskless rate in this model, is
simply:9
lnRt+1 = +    1
2
22 + p

1  Ed t+1

(9)
This says that the riskfree rate is the sum of the rate of time preference, , and the marginal
value of output (and consumption), , less components relating to risk in the normal and
abnormal states. The rst is the familiar convexity adjustment, while the second is the
expected value of incremental consumption in the disaster state. Note that, since 0 <
dt+1 < 1, the term in square brackets is negative, so that the riskless rate is unambiguously
decreasing in p.
6 The Credit Spread and Equity Risk Premium
In our model, the credit spread is equivalent to the di¤erence between the face return and the
risk-free rate i.e. the gap between the rates promised by corporate and government riskless
debt. Comparing (8) and (9), we get:
lnRFt+1   lnRt+1 =
p(1  t+1)

Ed t+1  
 
Ed t+1 j wt+1  wt+1

+pt+1
h
Ed t+1   te +(1 )+
1
2
(1 )22  E(d1 t+1 j wt+1 < wt+1)
i
(10)
which can be viewed as the sum of the required compensation for the expected loss in
default and the premium associated with this type of systematic risk. As Elton et al (2001)
emphasise, the latter component will be present as long as investors are risk-averse and, in
9 as in Barro (2006), in the special case when the default probability (denoted q in his model) is zero.
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fact, in the light of the evidence they and others have produced, actually accounts for much
of the spread.
To understand (10), note that when the probability of a crisis, p, is zero, there is no gap
between the returns on Government and private sector debt, since default can only occur in
crises. Another limiting case is the superprime borrowerfor whom wt+1 is near 0% i.e. the
borrower who would only be forced into default if income fell almost to zero. In this case,
the conditional and unconditional expectations in the rst square bracket are almost the
same thing, so that this component is very small. Likewise, the second term involves pt+1,
which will be extremely small (the probability of a crisis multiplied by the probability of
default, which is also tiny in this case). In sum, the credit spread will be small, as intuition
would lead us to expect, for a good quality borrower.
From (10), it is clear that the e¤ect of leverage on the credit spread is complex. To
see that this is the case, note that the nal term in square brackets will be substantially
greater than unity if  > 1, because the mean of the distribution of dt+1 in default scenarios
will be small. Since higher levels of leverage increase t+1; the e¤ect on the spread through
this component is positive. Moreover, this e¤ect will be reinforced because higher leverage
(lower t) makes the rm more vulnerable to a downturn. In other words, it raises wt+1,
making E(dt+1 j wt+1 < wt+1) larger and therefore E(d1 t+1 j wt+1 < wt+1) smaller, thereby
further widening the credit spread. On the other hand, the term in the rst square bracket
on the right hand side must be positive, and increasing in leverage. But higher leverage also
increases t+1 and hence reduces p(1  t+1); so that the e¤ect on the expression before the
plus sign as a whole is ambiguous. In the Appendix, we show that the net e¤ect is positive,
as might be expected i.e. a higher leverage is associated with a wider spread.
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As far as equity is concerned, leverage means that the payo¤ to shareholders is simply
the residue of output after the bondholders have received a sum no greater than the face
value of the debt plus the accrued interest. In the event of default, the return on equity is,
of course, zero. Hence the return on the levered equity is just:
RLt+1 =
At+1   tRBt+1
Pt   t 
At+1   tRBt+1
At   t (11)
which is related to the unlevered return by the familiar weighted average cost of capital
formula:
REt+1 =
t   1
t
RLt+1 +
1
t
RBt+1 (12)
where RE is the return on the underlying asset (i.e. on the unlevered equity), given by:
lnREt+1 = +   
1
2
22 + 2   p  Ed1 t+1   Edt+1 (13)
and RLand RB are the returns on the levered equity and on the rms bonds respectively.
The equity risk premium can then be derived from (11) and (9). Although our main concern
in this paper is with the pricing of debt, we also generate results for equities as an additional
check on the plausibility of our results, given that the data are more plentiful and more
accurate than they are for bond markets, a point emphasised by Huang and Huang (2003).
We now turn to the question of how far it is possible to explain the stylised facts within
the framework of the model set out here, using parameter values taken from Barro (2006)
and the more extensive data collected in Barro and Ursua (2008).
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7 Calibration
The key element in calibrating the model is the annual crisis probability, p, which was
estimated as 1.7% in Barro (2006) and 3.7% in Barro and Ursua (2008), and the frequency
distribution of the output contraction, 1 dt+1. In view of the problematic nature of historic
data, and the fact that the value of p is critically dependent on the denition of a crisis,
we calibrate for a number of di¤erent values in the range indicated by the facts for the
last century. It must be emphasised however that, while the equity risk premium puzzle as
originally posed by Mehra and Prescott (1985) was originally based on the experience of the
twentieth century, the credit risk spread has largely been considered in the context of datasets
which were shorter and hence possibly less representative. In particular, in comparing our
calibration results with current levels of the credit spread, we need to bear in mind that the
market may be anticipating a very di¤erent crisis frequency in the future than in the past.
In view of the importance of the crisis probability, we should make clear the channels
through which it impacts on the credit spread. On the one hand, the higher is the probability
of a crisis, p, the wider must be the credit spread, for the obvious reason that, in a more
uncertain world, risk-free assets must be more and risky assets less valuable, other things
being equal. On the other hand, a greater value for the riskless security and consequently
lower riskless rate, R; reduces the cost of debt service and thereby raises 1 wt+1, the critical
size of output contraction needed to trigger a default. This latter mechanism, taken on its
own, reduces the conditional probability of default, t+1. The credit spread is determined
by the unconditional probability of default, which is the product of p and t+1. Higher p
raises this probability directly, but indirectly (via a fall in t+1) reduces it. The net e¤ect is
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therefore complex, but as will be seen from our results, invariably positive in practice.
In Tables 1 and 2, we take as given the estimates of the rate of time preference, , the
trend growth rate, , and the standard deviation of normal shocks, , and show how the
results are a¤ected by changes in the crisis probability for di¤erent values of the leverage
ratio, and , the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Note that, as far as
the last parameter is concerned, we only take the values 3.0, 3.5 and 4.0, all well within the
range usually considered reasonable.
It can be seen that, for both parameter sets, the model generates plausible values of the
riskless rate (in the zero to 3% range), for the return on leveraged equity (the 7% to 11%
range) and for the equity risk premium (5% to 10%).
As far as the credit spread is concerned, note that the model generates values that are
as high as those actually observed, and even greater in some cases. For example, taking the
3.7% probability from Barro and Ursua (2008), we get spreads of 39, 74 or 147 points for the
three values of the risk aversion parameter,  = 3.0, 3.5 and 4.0 respectively, with a leverage
ratio of only 50%. At higher levels of leverage, the credit spread widens dramatically, to 99,
185 and 342 points at 75%, for example.
Note that the reason why this model yields such a large credit spread is to be found
in the correlation it generates between the discount factor and the loss in default, so that
corporate debt inicts heavy losses on investors in precisely those states where consumption
is most valuable. By contrast, Government debt is riskless and therefore benets from the
"ight to quality", so that its equilibrium return is reduced by the possibility of a severe
contraction in output.
At the same time, our results conrm the consensus view (e.g. Huang and Huang (2003),
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Elton et al (2001), Bhamra et al (2007)) that the credit spread overwhelmingly reects the
default risk premium rather than the expected loss. In fact, the cost of default makes a
negligible contribution for almost all values of the parameters. One possible explanation for
this result is that the recovery rates we generate look high relative to observed levels. There
are two reasons for this. First, we make no allowance here for the substantial costs lenders
have in reality to pay for recovering their loans. Secondly, as Huang and Huang (2003)
explicitly recognise in their continuous time model, in practice lenders are usually unable or
unwilling to call in loans as soon as the value of the entreprise falls to the face value of the
debt (in fact, Huang and Huang (2003) explicitly assume foreclosure at the 60% boundary).
In the context of our model, however, lenders have no reason to delay foreclosure, so they
capture a higher proportion of the assets. This in turn makes the expected loss in default
small.
8 The Credit Spread Time Series
Calibrations can only answer the question: how well does the model explain the average
credit spread and equity risk premium over the data period? We would ideally like to apply
a more demanding test of its validity, the problem of course being lack of data. However,
a kind of time series approach is possible based on a simulation of equation (10), using
quarterly values of the leverage ratio on the right hand side to predict the levels of the credit
spread on the left. Unfortunately, we are unable to cover anywhere near as long a period as
Barro and Ursua (2008). Instead, we are restricted to quarterly data from 1953 until early
2008, a total of 220 observations for the leverage ratio and the observed spread. Using the
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same parameter values as in the calibrations (i.e. derived from 120-year averages) makes the
test even more challenging.
Before examining the outcomes, it is worth noting that the relationship between the
leverage and the spread is not linear, as might appear at rst glance. One nonlinearity is
that the probability of default, t+1, is itself a function of the leverage ratio, as also is wt+1,
the threshold output level. The latter relationship is summarised in (5), where wt+1 and
the leverage ratio are inversely related for any given value of the face return, RFt+1, which
is endogenous, but in practice cannot be very far above 1.0. In fact, both wt+1 and the
spread are concave functions of the leverage ratio. The net e¤ect, however, must be that the
leverage ratio increases the credit spread (see Appendix).
Figure 1 shows the simulated spread (solid line) and the di¤erence between the yield
on Moodys Baa Index and the US Treasury benchmark 10-year yield (broken line). The
correlation coe¢ cient is 0.43. Note that the two series diverge in the mid-1990s, when
leverage ratios appear to have been driven down by the bull market in equities. Note also
that the predicted spread fell to zero at a number of points during the data period, as
leverage ratios were low enough to generate a smaller value of wt+1 than was ever observed
in the twentieth century, making the probability of default at these times zero.
9 Conclusions
We have shown that a generalised version of the Barro (2006) crisis model to allow for de-
faultable corporate debt can account for the broad facts about the credit spread for a range
of plausible values of the parameters and for two alternative estimates of the frequency dis-
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tributions of the large output contractions experienced in the last century. However, like
most other authors, we nd that very little of the credit spread appears to be explained by
expected default loss; it appears to be almost all risk premium. It is quite possible that
this result is due to sampling error of the peso-problem type. On the one hand, during our
data period in the USA there was no recession su¢ ciently grave to qualify as a crisis in the
Barro and Ursua (2008) denition of the word. However, the relevant probability distribu-
tion is the unobservable one on which the rational investor bases his or her behaviour. Even
with rationality, this subjective distribution may well deviate from the observed frequency
in the case of events far into the tail (the Peso Problem). Specically, it is unlikely to have
given a zero weight to the probability of a crisis, but on the other hand it is unlikely to have
been as pessimistic as the Barro and Ursua (2008) frequency distribution, which covers both
industrialised and developing countries, and in any case includes data from the rst half of
the twentieth century spanning two world wars and the interwar global slump. Insofar as
the spread data we observe may understate the probability distribution of a crisis occurring,
our estimates of the expected return on corporate debt (and hence the spread) may be bi-
ased upwards. Equally, basing our simulated series on an excessively pessimistic frequency
distribution may also have resulted in upward bias. There is no way of knowing which of
these two biases is the greater. Future research will need to be directed to this issue.
Moreover, like the rest of this literature, our work has nothing to say about events like
the 1929 or 1987 global stock market crashes nor the current nancial crisis. In all these
cases, the initial shock struck the nancial markets, with any impact on the real economy
following from it, so that the causal direction was the reverse of the one we model in this
paper. Accounting for this type of event will require substantial further work.
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10 Appendix
10.1 Riskless rate (equation (9))
Rt+1 =
1
E(SDFt+1)
=

(1  p)E(Mt+1) + pE(Mt+1  d t+1)
 1
=

	
 
1  p+ pEd t+1
 1
where
Mt+1 = e
   ut+1
	 = E(Mt+1) = e
  + 1
2
22
so:
lnRt+1  +    1
2
22 + p
 
1  Ed t+1

The approximation follows as p is close to zero.
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10.2 Face return of the bond
1 = E(SDFt+1 RBt+1)
= (1  p)E(Mt+1)RFt+1 + p(1  t+1)E[Mt+1  d t+1 j wt+1  wt+1]RFt+1
+pt+1E[t Mt+1  e+ut+1  d1 t+1 j wt+1 < wt+1]
= (1  p)E(Mt+1)RFt+1
+p(1  t+1)E(Mt+1)RFt+1  E[d t+1 j wt+1  wt+1]
+pt+1tE(Mt+1e
+ut+1)  E[d1 t+1 j wt+1 < wt+1]
= (1  p)	RFt+1
+p(1  t+1)	RFt+1  E[d t+1 j wt+1  wt+1] + pt+1t  E[d1 t+1 j wt+1 < wt+1]
= 	  (1  p)RFt+1 + p(1  t+1)RFt+1  E  d t+1 j wt+1  wt+1
+pt+1t  E
 
d1 t+1 j wt+1 < wt+1

where:
t+1 = pr(wt+1 < w

t+1)
t =
At
t
 = E(Mt+1e
+ut+1) = e +(1 )+
1
2
(1 )22
Hence:
RFt+1 =

1  pt+1t  E
 
d1 t+1 j wt+1 < wt+1


n
e  +
1
2
22  1  p+ p(1  t+1)  E  d t+1 j wt+1  wt+1o 1
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and:
lnRFt+1
 +    1
2
22 + p  pt+1tE
 
d1 t+1 j wt+1 < wt+1
  p(1  t+1)E  d t+1 j wt+1  wt+1
= +    1
2
22
+p
h
1  (1  t+1)E
 
d t+1 j wt+1  wt+1
  t+1te +(1 )+ 12 (1 )22E  d1 t+1 j wt+1 < wt+1i
where the approximation again uses the fact that p is close to zero.
10.3 Expected return of the bond (equation (8))
ERBt+1 = (1  pt+1)RFt+1 + pt+1t  E[e+ut+1  dt+1 j wt+1 < wt+1]
= (1  pt+1)RFt+1 + pt+1te+
1
2
2  E(dt+1 j wt+1 < wt+1)
= (1  pt+1)(RFt+1   1) + pt+1
h
te
+ 1
2
2  E(dt+1 j wt+1 < wt+1)  1
i
+ 1
so:
lnERBt+1  (1  pt+1) lnRFt+1 + pt+1
h
te
+ 1
2
2  E(dt+1 j wt+1 < wt+1)  1
i
where the approximation uses the fact that (RFt+1   1) and pt+1 are close to zero.
10.4 Proof that Credit Spread is Positively Related to Leverage
Since the riskless rate given by (9) is not dependent on the leverage ratio, we need only
concern ourselves with the determination of the nominal return on the corporate debt.
Note that wt+1 on the RHS of the previous equation is unknown and t+1 depends on
wt+1. Since we impose no analytical distribution on the disaster size, and instead rely on the
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empirical frequency, we cannot derive a closed-form analytical solution for the face return.
It has to be solved numerically, as shown in the calibration section. However, combining
(5) in the text with the last equation in the Appendix, we can deduce the nature of the
qualitative relationship between wt+1, the leverage ratio and R
F
t+1. The critical issue is the
direction of the change in wt+1 when leverage increases.
Consider two scenarios, involving quantities of debt 1 and 2, with 2 > 1. Let the
critical output levels associated with 1 and 2 be w1;t+1 and w

2;t+1 respectively. Which is
greater: w1;t+1 or w

2;t+1?
Case 1: w2;t+1 < w

1;t+1 In this case, as the debt burden becomes larger, the output
fall required to trigger default actually increases, and thus the probability of default gets
smaller. Consider what this means in an intermediate state when output is w0t+1 where
w2;t+1 < w
0
t+1 < w

1;t+1 i.e. when a disaster occurs that would previously have caused default
but no longer does so, even though the rm is more leveraged. This is clearly impossible
because, whereas previously the bondholders would have received the whole output w0t+1;they
can now only claim a part of it, with the remainder being paid out as a a dividend to the
equity. Given that, by construction, the upfront cost of the debt (its face value) is greater,
the result has to be a fall in the return on bonds when output is w0t+1and in all similar
intermediate states. As far as severe disaster states are concerned, when output is below
w2;t+1, the return also falls because the payo¤ is unchanged while the upfront cost increases.
These conclusions imply that, in order to preserve the pricing condition 1 = E(SDFt+1 
RBt+1), the returns in non-disaster and mild disaster states have to rise, which can only be
achieved by a rise in the face return of the bond. However, as equation (5) shows, the face
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return is increasing in the product of wt+1 and the asset-to-debt ratio. Therefore it cannot
rise when both factors have fallen. Hence, this is an impossible scenario.
Case 2: w2;t+1 > w

1;t+1 The reverse scenario is more complex.
Case 2A: When output is w00t+1where w

1;t+1 < w
00
t+1 < w

2;t+1, the total payo¤ to bond
holders increases because previously some output would have been paid as a dividend to
shareholders. However, there are now an increased number of bonds so that the return
might be higher or lower than the previous face return (though it is, by denition, lower
than the new face return).
Case 2B: When output is w00t+1where w
00
t+1 < w

1;t+1, the bondholders receive the whole
output, as before, but given their increased number, the realised returns must again be lower.
Case 2C: When output is w00t+1where w
00
t+1 > w

2;t+1; the bonds are paid their face
return.
However, both Cases 2A and 2C were no-default scenarios prior to the leverage increase.
Hence the return in both cases was the face return. After the leverage increase, the average
of the return in these two cases is less than the new face return, but higher than it was
previously. Hence the face return has risen.
Since the average return in Case 2B is lower after the leverage increase, the average
return in Case 2A and 2C must increase in order to maintain the pricing relationship 1 =
E(SDFt+1R
B
t+1). Since both Cases 2A and 2C were no-default scenarios prior to the leverage
increase, the return in both cases was the face return. After the leverage increase, Case 2A
brings default where the return is less than the new face return. Hence, the average return
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of Case 2A and 2C after the increase in leverage is less than the new face return, but it is
greater than the previous face return. Therefore, the face return must have risen. Proved.
28
3 5
4
SIMULATED SPREAD
FIGURE 1: SIMULATED vs ACTUAL CREDIT SPREAD 1953‐2008
2 5
3
.
ACTUAL SPREAD
1 5
2
.
1
.
0
0.5
5
3
Q
2
5
4
Q
3
5
5
Q
4
5
7
Q
1
5
8
Q
2
5
9
Q
3
6
0
Q
4
6
2
Q
1
6
3
Q
2
6
4
Q
3
6
5
Q
4
6
7
Q
1
6
8
Q
2
6
9
Q
3
7
0
Q
4
7
2
Q
1
7
3
Q
2
7
4
Q
3
7
5
Q
4
7
7
Q
1
7
8
Q
2
7
9
Q
3
8
0
Q
4
8
2
Q
1
8
3
Q
2
8
4
Q
3
8
5
Q
4
8
7
Q
1
8
8
Q
2
8
9
Q
3
9
0
Q
4
9
2
Q
1
9
3
Q
2
9
4
Q
3
9
5
Q
4
9
7
Q
1
9
8
Q
2
9
9
Q
3
0
0
0
Q
4
0
0
2
Q
1
0
0
3
Q
2
0
0
4
Q
3
0
0
5
Q
4
0
0
7
Q
1
1
9
1
9
1
9
1
9
1
9
1
9
1
9
1
9
1
9
1
9
1
9
1
9
1
9
1
9
1
9
1
9
1
9
1
9
1
9
1
9
1
9
1
9
1
9
1
9
1
9
1
9
1
9
1
9
1
9
1
9
1
9
1
9
1
9
1
9
1
9
1
9
1
9
1
9
2
0
2
0
2
0
2
0
2
0
2
0
TABLE 1: CALIBRATIONS WITH BARRO (2006) PARAMETERS (ρ = 3%  γ = 2.5%  σ = 2% )
 
p = 0.015   p = 0.017  p = 0.020
leverage 3 3.5 4 3 3.5 4 3 3.5 4
risk-free
0.5 5.32% 3.91% 1.06% 4.66% 2.89% -0.49% 3.66% 1.37% -2.81%
[-1%,3%] 0.75 5.32% 3.91% 1.06% 4.66% 2.89% -0.49% 3.66% 1.37% -2.81%
1 5.32% 3.91% 1.06% 4.66% 2.89% -0.49% 3.66% 1.37% -2.81%
1.5 5.32% 3.91% 1.06% 4.66% 2.89% -0.49% 3.66% 1.37% -2.81%
leveraged-equity 3 3.5 4 3 3.5 4 3 3.5 4
return 0.5 9.13% 9.86% 10.44% 8.95% 9.62% 10.13% 8.68% 9.25% 9.73%
[7%,11%] 0.75 9.39% 10.20% 10.85% 9.23% 9.99% 10.57% 9.00% 9.68% 10.20%
1 9.52% 10.36% 11.04% 9.38% 10.17% 10.78% 9.17% 9.89% 10.43%
1.5 9.66% 10.53% 11.20% 9.53% 10.35% 10.94% 9.33% 10.07% 10.56%
leveraged -risk premium 3 3.5 4 3 3.5 4 3 3.5 4
0.5 3.81% 5.96% 9.38% 4.29% 6.73% 10.62% 5.02% 7.88% 12.54%
[5%,10%] 0.75 4.07% 6.30% 9.79% 4.58% 7.10% 11.06% 5.35% 8.31% 13.01%
1 4.19% 6.45% 9.98% 4.72% 7.28% 11.27% 5.51% 8.52% 13.24%
1.5 4.33% 6.62% 10.14% 4.87% 7.45% 11.43% 5.67% 8.70% 13.37%
credit spread 3 3.5 4 3 3.5 4 3 3.5 4
0.5 0.09% 0.17% 0.29% 0.10% 0.19% 0.29% 0.12% 0.21% 0.14%
[0.4%, 3.6%] 0.75 0.56% 0.99% 1.74% 0.64% 1.12% 1.97% 0.75% 1.32% 2.25%
1 0.93% 1.58% 2.70% 1.05% 1.79% 3.05% 1.23% 2.10% 3.54%
1.5 1.37% 2.27% 3.79% 1.55% 2.58% 4.30% 1.82% 3.03% 5.06%
expected default loss 3 3.5 4 3 3.5 4 3 3.5 4
0.5 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0.75 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.03% 0.02% 0.02%
1 0.04% 0.04% 0.04% 0.05% 0.04% 0.04% 0.05% 0.05% 0.04%
1.5 0.08% 0.08% 0.08% 0.09% 0.09% 0.08% 0.10% 0.10% 0.09%
recovery rate 3 3.5 4 3 3.5 4 3 3.5 4
0.5 91.30% 92.24% 94.72% 91.87% 93.13% 96.19% 92.51% 94.50% 98.63%
0.75 81.98% 82.75% 84.37% 82.44% 83.45% 85.43% 83.14% 84.49% 86.39%
1 79.53% 79.88% 80.48% 79.86% 80.29% 80.94% 80.13% 80.59% 81.00%
1.5 69.40% 69.32% 69.65% 69.39% 69.41% 70.26% 69.52% 69.86% 71.23%
range found in historic
data [ …,...]
Highlighted data in normal (bold italic) font match histroric data for single target range (all four target ranges)
Ѳ Ѳ Ѳ
TABLE 2: CALIBRATIONS WITH BARRO (2008) PARAMETERS (ρ = 3%  γ = 2.5%  σ = 2% )
 p = 0.027  p = 0.037  p = 0.047
range found in historic 
data [ …,...]
Highlighted data in normal (bold italic) font match histroric data for single target range (all four target ranges)
Ѳ Ѳ Ѳ
leverage 3 3.5 4 3 3.5 4 3 3.5 4
risk-free
0.5 4.87% 3.17% -0.32% 2.85% 0.08% -5.14% 0.82% -3.01% -9.95%
[-1%,3%] 0.75 4.87% 3.17% -0.32% 2.85% 0.08% -5.14% 0.82% -3.01% -9.95%
1 4.87% 3.17% -0.32% 2.85% 0.08% -5.14% 0.82% -3.01% -9.95%
1.5 4.87% 3.17% -0.32% 2.85% 0.08% -5.14% 0.82% -3.01% -9.95%
leveraged-equity return 3 3.5 4 3 3.5 4 3 3.5 4
0.5 8.69% 9.34% 9.85% 8.02% 8.49% 8.72% 7.37% 7.62% 7.58%
[7%,11%] 0.75 8.95% 9.68% 10.24% 8.36% 8.92% 9.31% 7.79% 8.19% 8.36%
1 9.11% 9.88% 10.47% 8.58% 9.18% 9.56% 8.04% 8.49% 8.71%
1 5 9 29% 10 08% 10 65% 8 79% 9 42% 9 76% 8 29% 8 76% 8 96%. . . . . . . . . .
leveraged -risk premium 3 3.5 4 3 3.5 4 3 3.5 4
0.5 3.82% 6.17% 10.17% 5.18% 8.41% 13.85% 6.54% 10.63% 17.53%
[5%,10%] 0.75 4.08% 6.51% 10.56% 5.52% 8.84% 14.44% 6.96% 11.20% 18.31%
1 4.25% 6.71% 10.79% 5.73% 9.10% 14.70% 7.22% 11.50% 18.66%
1.5 4.43% 6.91% 10.98% 5.95% 9.34% 14.90% 7.47% 11.77% 18.91%
credit spread 3 3.5 4 3 3.5 4 3 3.5 4
0.5 0.30% 0.59% 1.08% 0.39% 0.74% 1.47% 0.47% 0.93% 1.87%
[0.4%, 3.6%] 0.75 0.73% 1.37% 2.57% 0.99% 1.85% 3.42% 1.24% 2.30% 4.29%
1 1.03% 1.89% 3.47% 1.41% 2.58% 4.73% 1.79% 3.26% 5.92%
1.5 1.45% 2.56% 4.57% 1.98% 3.50% 6.24% 2.51% 4.43% 7.86%
expected loss in default 3 3.5 4 3 3.5 4 3 3.5 4
0.5 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.01% 0.00%
0.75 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.03% 0.02% 0.02%
1 0.03% 0.03% 0.03% 0.04% 0.04% 0.04% 0.05% 0.05% 0.04%
1.5 0.07% 0.07% 0.06% 0.09% 0.08% 0.07% 0.10% 0.09% 0.08%
recovery rate 3 3 5 4 3 3 5 4 3 3 5 4 . . .
0.5 87.43% 86.77% 80.05% 85.04% 80.20% 82.21% 80.56% 80.88% 86.17%
0.75 78.90% 78.98% 79.67% 79.70% 79.29% 77.39% 78.91% 78.03% 77.75%
1 77.63% 77.47% 77.12% 77.24% 77.72% 77.94% 77.46% 77.53% 78.00%
1.5 75.07% 75.08% 75.27% 75.09% 75.54% 76.40% 75.46% 76.10% 74.98%
